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THE PALEOCLASSICAL INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM
THEORY
I. SCHMELZER
Abstract. This interpretation establishes a completely classical ontology –
only the classical trajectory in configuration space – and interprets the wave
function as describing incomplete information (in form of a probability flow)
about this trajectory. This combines basic ideas of de Broglie-Bohm theory
and Nelsonian stochastics about the trajectory with a Bayesian interpretation
of the wave function.
Various objections are considered and discussed. In particular a regularity
principle for the zeros of the wave function allows to meet the Wallstrom
objection.
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1. Introduction
The interpretation presented here completely revives classical ontology: Reality
is described completely by a classical trajectory q(t), in the classical configuration
space Q.
The wave function is also interpreted in a completely classical way – as a particu-
lar description of a classical probability flow, defined by the probability distribution
ρ(q) and average velocities vi(q). The formula which defines this connection has
been proposed by Madelung 1926 [1] and is therefore as old as quantum theory
itself. It is the polar decomposition
(1) ψ(q) =
√
ρ(q)e
i
~
S(q),
with the phase S(q) being a potential of the velocity vi(q):
(2) vi(q) = mij∂jS(q),
so that the flow is a potential one.1
This puts the interpretation into the classical realist tradition of interpretation
of quantum theory, the tradition of de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) theory [2], [3] and
Nelsonian stochastics [4].
But there is a difference – the probability flow is interpreted as describing in-
complete information about the true trajectory q(t). This puts the interpretation
into another tradition – the interpretation of probability theory as the logic of plau-
sible reasoning in situations with incomplete information, as proposed by Jaynes
[6]. This objective variant of the Bayesian interpretation of probability follows the
classical tradition of Laplace [7] (to be distinguished from the subjective variant
proposed by de Finetti [8]).
1Here, mij denotes a quadratic form – a “mass matrix” – on configuration space. I assume in
this paper that the Hamiltonian is quadratic in the momentum variables, thus,
(3) H(p, q) =
1
2
mijpipj + V (q).
This is quite sufficient for relativistic field theory, see app. A.
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So this interpretation combines two classical traditions – classical realism about
trajectories and the classical interpretation of probability as the logic of plausible
reasoning.
There is also some aspect of novelty – a clear and certain program for develop-
ment of subquantum theory. Quantum theory makes sense only as an approxima-
tion for potential probability flows. It has to be generalized to non-potential flows,
described by the flow variables ρ(q), vi(q). Without a potential S(q) there will be
also no wave function ψ(q) in such a subquantum theory. And the flow variables
are not fundamental fields themself, they also describe only incomplete information.
The fundamental theory has to be one for the classical trajectory q(t) alone.
So this interpretation is also a step toward the development of a subquantum
theory. This is an aspect which invalidates prejudices against quantum interpre-
tations as pure philosophy leading nowhere. Nonetheless even this program for
subquantum theory has also classical character, making subquantum theory closer
to a classical theory.
Thinking about how to name this interpretation of quantum theory, I have played
around with “neoclassical”, but rejected it, for a simple reason: There is nothing
“neo” in it. Instead, it deserves to be named “paleo”.2
And so I have decided to name this interpretation of quantum theory “paleo-
classical”.
1.1. The Bayesian character of the paleoclassical interpretation. The in-
terpretation of the wave function is essentially Bayesian.
It is the objective (information-dependent) variant of Bayesian probability, as
proposed by Jaynes [6], which is used here. It has to be distinguished from the
subjective variant proposed by de Finetti [8], which is embraced by the Bayesian
interpretation of quantum theory proposed by Caves, Fuchs and Schack [9].
The Bayesian interpretation of the wave function is in conflict with the objec-
tive character assigned to the wave function in dBB theory. Especially Bell has
emphasized that the wave function has to be understood as real object.
But the arguments in favour of the reality of the wave function, even if strong,
appear insufficient: The effective wave function of small subsystems depends on
the configuration of the environment. This dependence is sufficient to explain
everything which makes the wave function similar to a really existing object. It
is only the wave function of a closed system, like the whole universe, which is
completely interpreted in terms of incomplete information about the system itself.
Complexity and time dependence, even if they are typical properties of real
things, are characteristics of incomplete information as well.
The Bayesian aspects essentially change the character of the interpretation: The
dBB “guiding equation” (2), instead of guiding the configuration, becomes part
of the definition of the information about the configuration contained in the wave
function.
This has the useful consequence that there is no longer any “action without
reaction” asymmetry: While it is completely natural that the real configuration
does not have an influence on the information available about it, there is also no
longer any “guiding” of the configuration by the wave function.
2Association with the “paleolibertarian” political direction is welcome and not misleading – it
also revives classical libertarian ideas considered to be out of date for a long time.
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1.2. The realistic character of the paleoclassical interpretation. On the
other hand, there is also a strong classical realistic aspect of the paleoclassical
interpretation: First of all, it is a realistic interpretation. But, even more, its
ontology is completely classical – the classical trajectory q(t) is the only beable.
This defines an important difference between the paleoclassical interpretation
and other approaches to interpret the wave function in terms of information: It
answers the question “information about what” by explicitly defining the “what” –
the classical trajectory – and even the “how” – by giving explicit formulas for the
probability distribution ρ(q) and the average velocity vi(q).
The realistic character leads also to another important difference – that of mo-
tivation. For the paleoclassical interpretation, there is no need to solve a measure-
ment problem – there is none already in dBB theory, and the dBB solution of this
problem – the explicit non-Schro¨dinger evolution of the conditional wave function
of the measured system, defined by the wave function of system and measurement
device and the actual trajectory of the measurement device – can be used without
modification.
There is also no intention to save relativistic causality by getting rid of the non-
local collapse – the paleoclassical interpretation accepts a hidden preferred frame,
which is yet another aspect of its paleoclassical character. Anyway, because of
Bell’s theorem, there is no realistic alternative. 3
1.3. The justification. So nor the realistic approach of dBB theory, which re-
mains influenced by the frequentist interpretation of probability (an invention of
the positivist Richard von Mises [12]) and therefore tends to objectify the wave
function, nor the Bayesian approach, which embraces the anti-realistic rejection of
unobservables and therefore rejects the preferred frame, are sufficiently classical to
see the possibility of a completely classical picture.
But it is one thing to see it, and possibly even to like it because of its simplicity,
and another thing to consider it as justified.
The justification of the paleoclassical interpretation presented here is based on a
reformulation of classical mechanics in term of – a wave function. It is a simple vari-
ant of Hamilton-Jacobi theory with a density added, but this funny reformulation
of classical mechanics appears to be the key for the paleoclassical interpretation.
The point is that its exact equivalence to classical mechanics (in the domain of its
validity) and even the very fact that it shortly becomes invalid (because of caustics)
almost forces us to accept – for this classical variant – the interpretation in terms
of insufficient information. And it also provides all the details we use.
But, then, why should we change the ontological interpretation if all what
changes is the equation of motion? Moreover, if (as it appears to be the case)
the Schro¨dinger equation is simply the linear part of the classical equation, so that
there is not a single new term which could invalidate the interpretation? And where
one equation is the classical limit of the other one?
We present even more evidence of the conceptual equivalence between the two
equations: A shared explanation, in terms of information, that there should be
a global U(1) phase shift symmetry, a shared explanation of the product rule for
independence, a shared explanation for homogeneity of the equation. And there
3Here I, of course, have in mind the precise meaning of “realistic” used in Bell’s theorem,
instead of the metaphorical one used in “many worlds”, which is, in my opinion, not even a
well-defined interpretation.
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is, of course, the shared Born probability interpretation. All these things being
equal, why should one even think about giving the two wave functions a different
interpretation?
1.4. Objections. There are a lot of objections against this interpretation to care
about.
Some of them are quite irrelevant, because they are handled already appropri-
ately from point of view of de Broglie-Bohm theory, so I have banned them into
appendices: The objection of incompatibility with relativity (app. A), the Pauli
objection that it destroys the symmetry between configuration and momentum vari-
ables (app. B), some doubts about viability of field-theoretic variants related with
overlaps (app. C).
There are the arguments in favour of interpreting the wave function as describing
external real beables. These are quite strong but nonetheless insufficient: The
effective wave functions of small subsystems – and we have no access to different
ones – depend on real beables external to the system itself, namely the trajectories
of the environment. And complexity and dynamics are properties of incomplete
information as well.
And there is the Wallstrom objection [10], the in my opinion most serious one.
How to justify, in terms of ρ(q) and vi(q), the “quantization condition”
(4)
∮
mijv
i(q)dqj =
∮
∂jS(q)dq
j = 2pim~, m ∈ Z.
for closed trajectories around zeros of the wave function, which is, in quantum
theory, a trivial consequence of the wave function being uniquely defined globally,
but which is completely implausible if formulated in terms of the velocity field?
Fortunately, I have found a solution of this problem in [11], based on an addi-
tional regularity postulate. All what has to be postulated is that 0 < ∆ρ(q) < ∞
almost everywhere where ρ(q) = 0. This gives the necessary quantization condi-
tion. Moreover, there are sufficiently strong arguments that this condition can be
justified by a subquantum theory.
The idea that what we observe are localized wave packets instead of the con-
figurations themself I reject in app. D. So all the objections I know about can be
answered in a satisfactory way. Or at least I think so.
1.5. Directions of future research. Different from many other interpretations of
quantum theory, the paleoclassical interpretation suggests a quite definite program
of development of a more fundamental, subquantum theory: It defines the ontology
of subquantum theory as well as the equation which can hold only approximately –
the potentiality condition for the velocity vi(q). The consideration of the Wallstrom
objection even identifies the domain where modifications of quantum theory are
necessary – the environment of the zeros of the wave function.
One can identify also another domain where quantum predictions will fail in sub-
quantum theory – the reliability of quantum computers, in particular their ability
to reach exponential speedup in comparison with classical computers.
Another interesting question is what restrictions follow for ρ(q), vi(q) from the
interpretation as a probability flow for a more fundamental theory for the trajectory
q(t) alone. An answer may be interesting for finding answers to the “why the
quantum” question. A question which cannot be answered by an interpretation
which is restricted to the “what is the quantum” question.
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2. A wave function variant of Hamilton-Jacobi theory
Do you know that one can reformulate classical theory in terms of a wave func-
tion? With an equation for this wave function which is completely classical, but,
nonetheless, quite close to the Schro¨dinger equation?
In fact, this is a rather trivial consequence of the mathematics of Hamilton-
Jacobi theory and the insights of Madelung [1], de Broglie [2], and Bohm [3]. All
one has to do is to look at them from another point of view. Their aim was to
understand quantum theory, by representing quantum theory in a known, more
comprehensible, classical form – a form remembering the classical Hamilton-Jacobi
equation
(5) ∂tS(q) +
1
2
mij∂iS(q)∂jS(q) + V (q) = 0.
So, the real part of the Schro¨dinger equation, divided by the wave function, gives
(6) ∂tS(q) +
1
2
mij∂iS(q)∂jS(q) + V (q) +Q[ρ] = 0,
with only one additional term – the quantum potential
(7) Q[ρ] = −~
2
2
mij∂i∂j
√
ρ√
ρ
The imaginary part of the Schro¨dinger equation (also divided by ψ(q)) is the con-
tinuity equation for ρ
(8) ∂tρ(q, t) + ∂i(ρ(q, t)v
i(q, t)) = 0
Now, all what we have to do is to revert the aim – instead of presenting the
Schro¨dinger equation like a classical equation, let’s present the classical Hamilton-
Jacobi equation like a Schro¨dinger equation. There is almost nothing to do – to add
a density ρ(q) together with a continuity equation (8) is trivial. We use the same
polar decomposition formula (1) to define the classical wave function. It remains
to do the same procedure in the other direction. The difference is the same – the
quantum potential. So we obtain, as the equation for the classical wave function,
an equation I will name here pre-Schro¨dinger equation:
(9) i~∂tψ(q, t) = −~
2
2
mij∂i∂jψ(q, t) + (V (q)−Q[ρ])ψ(q, t) = Hˆψ −Q[|ψ|2]ψ.
Of course, the additional term is a nasty, nonlinear one. But that’s the really
funny point: We can obtain now quantum theory as a linear approximation of
classical theory, in other words, as a simplification4
But there is more than this in this classical equation for the classical wave equa-
tion. The point is that there is an exact equivalence between the different formula-
tions of classical theory, despite the fact that one is based on a classical trajectory
q(t) only, and the other has a wave function ψ(q, t) together with the trajectory
q(t). And it is this exact equivalence which can be used to identify the meaning of
the classical wave function.
Because of its importance, let’s formulate this in form of a theorem:
4But note the important point that the very definition of “linear approximation” depends
on the definition of the “wave function.”, which depends on a choice of the classically arbitrary
parameter ~. So there is not, as usual, a meaningful notion of “the linear approximation”.
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Theorem 1 (equivalence). Assume ψ(q, t), q(t) fulfill the pre-Schro¨dinger equa-
tion (9) for some Hamilton function H(p, q) of type (3), together with the guiding
equation (2).
Then, whatever the initial values ψ0(q), q0 for the wave function ψ0(q) = ψ(q, t0)
and the initial configuration q0 = q(t0), there exists initial values q0, p0 so that the
Hamilton equation for H(p, q) with these initial values gives q(t).
Proof. The difficult part of this theorem is classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory, so,
presupposed here as known. The simple modifications of this theory used here
– adding the density ρ(q), with continuity equation (8), and rewriting the result
in terms of the wave function ψ(q) defined by the polar decomposition (1), copy-
ing what has been done by Bohm [3] – do not endanger the equivalence between
Hamiltonian (or Lagrangian) and Hamilton-Jacobi theory. 
3. The wave function describes incomplete information
So let’s evaluate now what follows from the equivalence theorem about the phys-
ical meaning of the (yet classical) wave function.
First, it is the classical (Hamiltonian or Lagrangian) variant which is preferable
as a fundamental theory. There are three arguments to justify this:
• Simplicity of the set of fundamental variables: We need only a single tra-
jectory q(t) instead of trajectory q(t) together with a wave function ψ(q, t).
• Correspondence between fundamental variables and observables: It is only
the trajectory q(t) in configuration space which is observable.
• Stability in time: The wave function develops caustics after a short period
of time and becomes invalid. The classical equations of motion does not
have such a problem.
So it is the classical variant which is preferable as a fundamental theory. Thus,
we can identify the true beable of classical theory with the classical trajectory q(t).
The next observation is that, once q(t) is known and fixed, the wave function
contains many degrees of freedom which are unobservable in principle: Many differ-
ent wave functions define the same trajectory q(t). So we can conclude that these
different wave functions do not describe physically different states, containing ad-
ditional beables.
On the other hand, this is true only if q is known. What if q is not known? In this
case, the wave function defines simply a subset of all possible classical trajectories,
and a probability measure on this subset.
To illustrate this, a particular most important example of a Hamilton-Jacobi
function is useful: It is the function S(q0, t0, q1, t1) defined by
(10) S(q0, t0, q1, t1) =
∫ t1
t0
L(q(t), q˙(t), t)dt,
where the integral is taken over the classical solutions q(t) of this minimum prob-
lem with initial and final values q(t0) = q0, q(t1) = q1. This function fulfills the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation in the variables q0, t0 as well as q1, t1. In both versions,
it can be characterized as a Hamilton-Jacobi function S(q, t) which is defined by a
subset of trajectories: The function S(q0, t0, q, t) describes the subset of trajecto-
ries going through q0 at t0, while the function S(q, t, q1, t1) describes the subset of
trajectories going through q1 at t1.
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We can generalize this. The phase S(q, t) tells us the value of q˙(t) given q(t): If
q(t) = q0 then q˙(t) = v0, with v0 defined by the guiding equation (2). So, S(q, t)
always distinguishes a particular subset of classical trajectories.
Even more specific, this subset described by S(q, t) can be uniquely described
in terms of a subset of the possible initial values at the moment of time t – the
configuration q(t0) and the momentum p(t0) = ∇S(q(t0), t0), that means, as a
subset of the possible values for the fundamental beables q, p (or q, q˙).
The other part – the density ρ(q) – is nothing but a probability density on this
particular subset.
Of course, a subset is nothing but a special delta-like probability measure, so
that the wave function simply defines a probability density on the set of possible
initial values:
(11) ρ(p, q)dpdq = ρ(q)δ(p−∇S(q))dpdq
The pre-Schro¨dinger equation is, therefore, nothing but the evolution equation for
this particular probability distribution.
So our classical, Hamilton-Jacobi wave function is nothing mystical, but simply a
very particular form of a standard classical probability density ρ(p, q) on the phase
space.
In particular, the pre-Schro¨dinger equation for the wave function is nothing but
a particular case of the Liouville equation, the standard law of evolution of standard
classical probability distributions ρ(p, q), for the particular ansatz (11), and follows
from the fundamental law of evolution for the true, fundamental classical beables.
Moreover, the Liouville equation also defines the domain of applicability of the
equation for the wave function. This domain is, in fact, restricted. In terms of
ρ(p, q), it will always remain a probability distribution on some Lagrangian sub-
manifold. But this Lagrangian submanifold will be, after some time, no longer a
graphic of a function p = ∇S(q) on configuration space – there may be caustics,
and in this case there will be several values of momentum for the same configuration
q. If this happens, the wave function is no longer an adequate description.
Such an effect – restricted validity – is quite natural for the evolution of infor-
mation, but not for fundamental beables.
So the wave function variant of Hamilton-Jacobi theory almost forces us to accept
an interpretation of the wave function in terms of incomplete information. Indeed,
• The parts of the wave function, ρ(q) as well as S(q), make sense as de-
scribing a well-defined type of incomplete information about the classical
configuration, namely the probability distribution ρ(p, q) defined by (11).
• The alternative, to interpret the wave function as describing some other,
external beables, does not make sense, given the observational equivalence
of the theory with simple Lagrangian classical mechanics, with q(t) as the
only observable. Additional beables should influence, at least in some cir-
cumstances, the q(t). They don’t.
So it looks like a incomplete information, it behaves like incomplete information,
it becomes invalid like incomplete information – it is incomplete information.
And, given that we know, in the case of the pre-Schro¨dinger equation, the funda-
mental law of evolution of the beables themself, it also makes no sense to reify this
particular probability distribution as objective. A probability distribution defines
a set of incomplete information about the real configuration, that’s all.
THE PALEOCLASSICAL INTERPRETATION 9
3.1. What about the more general case? Of course, the considerations both
have been based on the equivalence theorem between the classical evolution and
the evolution defined by the pre-Schro¨dinger equation. It was this exact equiva-
lence which was able to give us some certainty, to remove all doubts that there is
something else, some information about other beables, hidden in the wave function.
But what about the more general case, the case where we do not have an exact
equivalence between an equation in terms of q, ψ(q) and an equation purely in terms
of the classical trajectory q(t)? In such a situation, the case for an interpretation
of ψ(q) in terms of incomplete information about the q(t) is, of course, a little bit
weaker.
Nonetheless, given such an ideal correspondence for the pre-Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, the interpretation remains certainly extremely plausible in a more general
situation too. Indeed, why should one change the interpretation, the ontological
meaning, of ψ(q), if all what is changed is that we have replaced the pre-Schro¨dinger
equation by another equation? The evolution equation is different, that’s all. In it-
self, a modification of the evolution equation does not give even a bit of motivation
to change the interpretation.
And I think that to find such a motivation is a really hard job. The similarity
between the two variants of the Schro¨dinger equation does not makes it easier:
The funny observation that the Schro¨dinger equation is the linear part of the pre-
Schro¨dinger equation becomes relevant here. If the Schro¨dinger equation would
contain some new terms, this would open the door for attempts to show that the
new terms do not make sense in the original interpretation. But there are no
new terms in the linear part of the pre-Schro¨dinger equation. All terms of the
Schro¨dinger equation are already contained in the pre-Schro¨dinger equation. So
they all make sense.5
3.2. The classical limit. There is also another strong argument for interpreting
both theories in the same way – that classical theory appears as the classical limit
of quantum theory.
The immediate consequence of this is that both theories have the same intention
– the description, as accurate as possible, of the same reality.
So this is not a situation where the same mathematical apparatus is applied
to quite different phenomena, so that it is natural use a different interpretation
even if the same mathematical apparatus is applied. In our case, we use the same
mathematical formalism to describe the same thing. At least in the classical limit,
quantum theory has to describe the same thing – with the same interpretation – as
the classical interpretation.
4. What follows from the interpretation
But there is not only the similarity between the equations, and that the object is
essentially the same, which suggests to use the same interpretation for both variants
of the wave function.
5It has to be mentioned in this connection that there is something present in the Schro¨dinger
equation which is not present in the pre-Schro¨dinger equation – the dependence on ~. So one
can at least try to base an argument on this additional dependence. But, as described below, if
one incorporates a Nelsonian stochastic process, the dependence on ~ appears in a natural way
as connected with the stochastic process. So to use this difference to justify a modification of the
ontology remains quite nontrivial.
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There are also some interesting consequences of the interpretation. And these
consequences, to be shared by all wave functions which follow this interpretation,
are fulfilled by the quantum wave function.
4.1. The relevance of the information contained in the wave function.
A first consequence of the interpretation can be found considering the relevance
of the information contained in the wave function, as information about the real
beables. In fact, assume that the wave function ψ(q) contains a lot of information
which is irrelevant as information about the q. This would open the door for some
speculation about the nature of this additional information. Once it cannot be
interpreted as information about the q, it has to contain information about some
other real beables. So let’s consider which of the information contained in the wave
function is really relevant, tells us something about the true trajectory q(t).
Now, knowledge about the probability ρ(q) is certainly relevant if we don’t know
the real value of q. And it is relevant in all of its parts.
Then, as we have seen, S(q) gives us, via the “guiding equation” (2), the clearly
relevant information about the value of q˙ given the value of q. Given that we don’t
know the true value of q, this information is clearly relevant. But, different from
ρ(q), the function S(q) contains also a little bit more: Another function S′ = S+ c
would give exactly the same information about the real beables.
As a consequence, the wave function ψ(q) also contains a corresponding addi-
tional, irrelevant information. The polar decomposition (1) defines what it is – a
global constant phase factor.
So we find that all the information contained in ψ(q) – except for a global constant
phase factor – is relevant information about the real beables q.
At a first look, this seems trivial, but I think it is a really remarkable property
of the paleoclassical interpretation.
The irrelevance of the phase factor is a property of the interpretation of the
meaning of the wave function. It follows from this interpretation: We have consid-
ered all the ways how to obtain information about the beables from ψ(q), and we
have found that all the information is relevant, except this constant phase factor.
And now let’s consider the equations. Above equations considered up to now –
the pre-Schro¨dinger equation as well as the Schro¨dinger equation – have the same
symmetry regarding multiplication with a constant phase factor: Together with
ψ(q, t), cψ(q, t) is a solution of the equations too.
This is, of course, how it should be if the wave function describes incomplete
information about the q. If, instead, it would describe some different, external
beables, then there would be no reason at all to assume such a symmetry. In fact,
why should the values of some function, values at points far away from each other,
be connected with each other by such a global symmetry?
So every interpretation which assigns the status of reality to ψ(q) has, in com-
parison, a problem to explain this symmetry. A popular solution is to assign reality
not to ψ(q), but, instead, to the even more complicate density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ|. The
flow variables are, obviously, preferable by simplicity.
4.2. The independence condition. It is one of the great advantages of Jaynes’
information-based approach to plausible reasoning [6] that it contains common
sense principles to be applied in situations with insufficient information. If we have
no information which distinguishes the probability of the six possible outcomes of
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throwing a die, we have to assign equal probability to them. Everything else would
be irrational.6
Similar principles work if we consider the question of independence. From a
frequentist’s point of view, independence is a quite nontrivial physical assumption,
which has to be tested. And, in fact, there is no justification for it, at least none
coming from the frequentist interpretation. From point of view of the logic of
plausible reasoning, the situation is much better: Once we have no information
which justifies any hypothesis of a dependence between two statements A and B,
we have to assume their independence. There is no information which makes A
more or less plausible given B, so we have to assign equal plausibilities to them:
P (A|B) = P (A). But this is the condition of independence P (AB) = P (A)P (B).
The different status of plausibilities in comparison with physical hypotheses
makes this obligatory character reasonable. Probabilities are not hypotheses about
reality, but logical conclusions derived from the available information, derived using
the logic of plausible reasoning.
Now, all this is much better explained in [6], so why I talk here about this? The
point is that I want to obtain here a formula which appropriately describes different
independent subsystems. Subsystems are independent if we have no information
suggesting their dependence. A quite typical situation, so independence is quite
typical too.
So assume we have two subsystems, and we have no information suggesting any
dependence between them. What do we have to assume based on the logic of
plausible reasoning?
For the probability distribution itself, the answer is trivial:
(12) ρ(q1, q2) = ρ1(q1)ρ2(q2).
But what about the phase function S(q)? We have to assume that the velocity of
one system is independent of the state of the other one. So the potential of that
velocity also should not depend on the state of the other system. So we obtain
(13) S(q1, q2) = S1(q1) + S2(q2).
This gives, combined using the polar decomposition (1), the following rule for the
wave function:
(14) ψ(q1, q2) = ψ1(q1)ψ2(q2).
Of course, again, the rule is trivial. Nobody would have proposed any other rule
for defining a wave function in case of independence. Nonetheless, I consider it as
remarkable that it has been derived from the very logic of plausible reasoning and
the interpretation of the wave function.
And, again, this property is shared by both variants, the quantum as well as the
classical one. And if one thinks about the applicability of this rule to the classical
variant of the wave function, one has to recognize that it is nontrivial: From a
classical point of view, the rule of combining ρ(q) and S(q) into a wave function
ψ(q) is quite arbitrary, and there is no a priori reason to expect that such an
arbitrary combination transforms the rule for defining independent classical states
6The purely subjectivist, de Finetti approach differs here. It does not make prescriptions about
the initial probability distributions – all what is required is that one updates the probabilities
following the rules of Bayesian updating. This difference is one of the reasons for my preference
for the objective approach proposed by Jaynes [6]
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into a simple rule for independent wave functions, moreover, into the one used in
quantum theory.
4.3. Appropriate reduction to a subsystem. While the pre-Schro¨dinger equa-
tion is non-linear, it shares with the Schro¨dinger equation the weaker property of
homogeneity of degree one: The operator condition
(15) Ω(cψ) = cΩ(ψ)
holds not only for the Schro¨dinger operator, but also for the non-linear pre-
Schro¨dinger operator, and not only for |c| = 1, as required by the U(1) symmetry,
which we have already justified, but for arbitrary c, so that the U(1) symmetry is,
in fact, a GL(1) symmetry of the equations.
So one ingredient of linearity is shared by the pre-Schro¨dinger equation. This
suggests that for this property there should be a more fundamental explanation, one
which is shared by both equations. And, indeed, such an explanation is possible.
There should be a principle which allows an appropriate reduction of the equation
to subsystems, something like the following
Principle 1 (splitting principle). There should a be simple “no interaction”
conditions for the operators on a system consisting of two subsystems of type
Ω = Ω1 + Ω2 such that the equation ∂tψ = Ω(ψ) splits for independent product
states ψ(q1, q2) = ψ1(q1)ψ2(q2) into independent equation’s for the two subsystems.
Now, the time derivative splits nicely:
(16) ∂tψ(q1, q2) = ∂tψ1(q1)ψ2(q2) + ψ1(q1)∂tψ2(q2).
It remains to insert the equations for the whole system ∂tψ = Ω(ψ) as well as for
the two subsystems into this equation. This gives:
(17) Ω(ψ1(q1)ψ2(q2)) = Ω1(ψ1(q1))ψ2(q2) + ψ1(q1)Ω2(ψ2(q2)),
where the Ωi are subsystem operators acting only on the qi, so that functions of the
other variable are simply constants for them. On the other hand, in the splitting
principle we have assumed Ω = Ω1 +Ω2. Comparison gives
Ω1(ψ1(q1)ψ2(q2)) = Ω1(ψ1(q1))ψ2(q2),
Ω2(ψ1(q1)ψ2(q2)) = ψ1(q1)Ω2(ψ2(q2)).
(18)
This follows from the homogeneity condition (15). The weaker U(1) symmetry is
not sufficient, because the values of ψ2(q2) may be arbitrary complex numbers.
Something similar to the splitting property is necessary for any equation relevant
for us – we have not enough information to consider the equation of the whole
universe, thus, have to restrict ourself to small subsystems. And the equations of
these subsystems should be at least approximately independent of the state of the
environment.
So the homogeneity of the equations – in itself a quite nontrivial property of the
equations, given the definition of the wave function by polar decomposition – can
be explained by this splitting property.
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4.4. Summary. So we have found three points, each in itself quite trivial, but
each containing some nontrivial element of explanation based on the paleoclassical
principles: The global U(1) phase shift symmetry of the wave function, explained
by the irrelevance of the phase as information about q(t), the product rule of in-
dependence, explained by the logic of plausible reasoning, applied to the set of
information described by the wave function, and the homogeneity of the equations,
explained in terms of a splitting property for independent equations for subsystems.
All three points follow the same scheme – the interpretation in terms of incom-
plete information allows to derive a rule, and this rule is shared by both theories,
quantum theory as well as the wave function variant of classical theory.
So all three points give additional evidence that the simple, straightforward
proposal to use the same interpretation of the wave function for both theories is
the correct one.
5. Incorporating Nelsonian stochastics
The analogy between pre-Schro¨dinger and Schro¨dinger equation is a useful one,
but it is that useful especially because the equations are nonetheless very different.
And one should not ignore these differences.
One should not, in particular, try to interpret the Schro¨dinger equation as the
linear approximation of the pre-Schro¨dinger equation: The pre-Schro¨dinger equa-
tion does not depend on ~. Real physical effects do depend. And so there should
be also something in the fundamental theory, the theory in terms of the trajectory
q(t), which depends on ~.
Here, Nelsonian stochastics comes into mind. In Nelsonian stochastics the de-
velopment of the configuration q in time is described by a deterministic drift term
bi(q(t), t)dt and a stochastic diffusion term dBit
(19) dqi(t) = bi(q(t), t)dt + dBit ,
with is a classical Wiener process Bit with expectation 0 and variance
(20) 〈dBitmijdBjt 〉 = ~dt,
so that we have a ~-dependence on the fundamental level. The probability distri-
bution ρ(q(t), t) has, then, to fulfill the Fokker-Planck-equation:
(21) ∂tρ+ ∂i(ρb
i)− ~
2
mij∂i∂jρ = 0
For the average velocity vi one obtains
(22) vi(q(t), t) = bi(q(t), t) − ~
2
mij∂jρ(q(t), t)
ρ(q(t), t)
,
which fulfills the continuity equation. The difference between flow velocity bi and
average velocity vi, the osmotic velocity
(23) ui(q(t), t) = bi(q(t), t)− vi(q(t), t) = ~
2
mij∂jρ(q(t), t)
ρ(q(t), t)
=
~
2
mij∂j ln ρ(q(t), t)
has a potential ln ρ(q). The average acceleration is given by
(24) ai(q(t), t) = ∂tv
i + vj∂jv
i − ~
2
2
mij∂j
(
mkl∂k∂l
√
ρ(q(t), t)√
ρ(q(t), t)
)
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For this average acceleration the classical Newtonian law
(25) ai(q(t), t) = −mij∂jV (q(t), t)
is postulated. Putting this into the equation (24) gives
(26) ∂tv
i + (vj∂j)v
i = −mij∂j
(
V − ~
2
2
∆
√
ρ√
ρ
)
= −mij∂j(V +Q[ρ]).
The next postulate is that the average velocity vi(q) has, at places where ρ > 0,
a potential, that means, a function S(q), so that (2) holds. Then equation (26) can
be integrated (putting the integration constant into V (q)), which gives (6). Finally,
one combines the equations for S(q) and ρ(q) into the Schro¨dinger equation as in
de Broglie-Bohm theory.
So far the basic formulas of Nelsonian stochastics. Now, the beables of Nelsonian
stochastics are quite different from those of the paleoclassical interpretation. The
external flow bi(q, t) does not define some state of information, but some objective
flow which takes away the configuration if it is at q. The configuration is guided in
a way close to a swimmer in the ocean: He can randomly swim into one or another
direction, but wherever he is, he is always driven by the flow of the ocean, a flow
which exists independent of the swimmer.
What would be the picture suggested for a stochastic process by the paleoclassical
interpretation? It would be different, more close to a spaceship flying in the cosmos.
If it changes its place because of some stochastic process, there will be no predefined,
independent velocity bi(q) at the new place which can guide it. Instead, it would
have to follow its previous velocity. Indeed, the velocity field vi(q), and, therefore,
also bi(q), of the new place describes only information, not a physical field which
could possibly influence the spaceship in its new position.
But what follows for the information if there is some probability that the sto-
chastic process causes the particle to change its location to the new one? It means
that the old average velocity has to be recomputed.
Of course, there is such a necessity to recompute only if the velocity at the new
location is different from the old one. So, if ∂iv
k = mjk∂ipj = 0, there would be
no need for such a recomputation at all. This condition is clearly too strong, it
would cause the whole velocity field to become constant. Now there is an interesting
sub-condition, namely that ∂ipj − ∂jpi = 0, the condition that the velocity field
is a potential one. So the re-averaging of the average velocity vi(q) caused by the
stochastic process will decrease the curl.
This gives a first advantage in comparison with Nelsonian stochastics: The po-
tentiality assumption does not have to be postulated, without any justification, for
the external flow bi(q, t). (It is postulated for average velocity, but their difference –
the osmotic velocity – has a potential anyway.) In the paleoclassical interpretation
we have an independent motivation for postulating this. But, let’s recognize, there
is no fundamental reason to postulate potentiality: On the fundamental level, the
curl may be nontrivial. All what is reached is that the assumption of potentiality
is not completely unmotivated, but that it appears as a natural consequence of the
necessary re-averaging.
There is another strangeness connected with the external flow picture of Nelso-
nian stochastics. The probability distribution ρ(q) already characterizes the infor-
mation about the configuration itself – it is a probability for the swimmer in the
ocean, not for the ocean. Once they depend on ρ(q), as the average velocity vi(q),
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as the average acceleration ai(q) also describe information about the swimmer, not
about the ocean. Then, it is postulated that the average acceleration of the swim-
mer has to be defined by the Newtonian law. But because this average velocity is,
essentially, already defined by the very process – the flow of the ocean – together
with the initial value for the swimmer, this condition for the swimmer becomes an
equation for the ocean. This is conceptually unsound – as if the ocean has to care
that the swimmer is always correctly accelerated.
But this conceptual inconsistency disappears in the paleoclassical interpretation.
The drift field is now part of the incomplete information about the configuration
itself, as defined by the average velocity and osmotic velocity. There is no longer
any external drift field. And, so, it is quite natural that a condition for the average
acceleration of the configuration gives an equation for the average velocity vi(q).
So the paleoclassical picture is internally much more consistent.
6. Enthropic dynamics
The inconsistency of Nelsonian stochastics we have mentioned above has been
also solved in another approach – the “entropic dynamics” [5]. In this approach,
the external flow bi(q, t) is a potential flow, with the entropy S(q) as the potential
of this flow.
Conceptually, this approach is very close to this approach. We have a con-
figuration q (denoted there by x to describe the position of one or more non-
relativistic particles) together with an unspecified set of additional variables y.
These other variables somehow interact with q, and their probability distribu-
tion p(y|q) depends on q and motivates the definition of a corresponding entropy
S(q) =
∫
p(y|q) ln p(y|q)dy depending on q too.
How can this be made compatible with the paleoclassical approach, which does
not have such external degrees of freedom? This appears quite easy: We always
consider only some small subsystem of the whole universe. So, we always have two
parts of the whole universe: first, the system q we study, and, then, the remaining
part of the universe, the environment qenv , so that quniv = (q, qenv).
Unfortunately, another point seems more problematic: The condition that the
probability flow has a potential obtains a more fundamental role in this interpreta-
tion. Here, the potential of the flow is identified with the entropy. This makes the
potential a well-defined global function, which is defined (as it would look like in
our approach) by S(q) =
∫
p(qenv|q) ln p(qenv|q)dqenv .
This makes it more problematic to solve the Wallstrom objection. The point
is that our proposal for the solution of the Wallstrom objection requires that the
probability flow does not have a global potential: It can have a potential locally,
but not near the zeros of the wave function, thus, the local potentials cannot be
used to define a global potential.
But the situation is not at all hopeless. The identification of S(q) with entropy
(as a well-defined global function) holds only for a part of the probability flow, the
one which corresponds to the external flow bi(q, t). There is also the other part, the
osmotic flow. Of course, the osmotic velocity has also a potential ln ρ(q). But this
potential becomes anyway infinite near the zeros of the wave function, thus, needs
to be regularized in the entropic approach too. This regularization can possibly
solve the problem, following the lines proposed in sect. 8 and [10].
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7. The character of the wave function
Let’s start with the consideration of the objections against the paleoclassical
interpretation. Given that the basic formulas are not new at all, I do not have to
wait for reactions to this paper – some quite strong arguments are already well-
known.
The first one is the evidence in favour of the thesis that the wave function
describes the behaviour of real degrees of freedom, degrees of freedom which actually
influence the things we can observe immediately. Here, at first Bell’s argumentation
comes into mind – an argumentation for a double ontology which, I think, has
impressed many of those who support today realistic interpretations:
Is it not clear fro the smallness of the scintillation on the screen
that we have to do with a particle? And is it not clear, from the
diffraction and interference patterns, that the motion of the particle
is directed by a wave? ([21] p. 191).
But what are the points which make this argument that impressive? What is it
what motivates us to accept some things as real? Here I see no way to express this
better than Brown and Wallace:
From the corpuscles’ perspective, the wave-function is just a (time-
dependent) function on their configuration space, telling them how
to behave; it superficially appears similar to the Newtonian or
Coulomb potential field, which is again a function on configura-
tion space. No-one was tempted to reify the Newtonian potential;
why, then, reify the wave-function?
Because the wave-function is a very different sort of entity. It
is contingent (equivalently, it has dynamical degrees of freedom
independent of the corpuscles); it evolves over time; it is struc-
turally overwhelmingly more complex (the Newtonian potential can
be written in closed form in a line; there is not the slightest possibil-
ity of writing a closed form for the wave-function of the Universe.)
Historically, it was exactly when the gravitational and electric fields
began to be attributed independent dynamics and degrees of free-
dom that they were reified: the Coulomb or Newtonian ‘fields’ may
be convenient mathematical fictions, but the Maxwell field and the
dynamical spacetime metric are almost universally accepted as part
of the ontology of modern physics.
We don’t pretend to offer a systematic theory of which mathe-
matical entities in physical theories should be reified. But we do
claim that the decision is not to be made by fiat, and that some
combination of contingency, complexity and time evolution seems
to be a requirement. ([16] p. 12-13)
So, let’s consider the various points in favour of the reality of the wave function:
7.1. Complexity of the wave function. The argument of complexity seems pow-
erful. But, in fact, for an interpretation in terms of incomplete information this is
not a problem at all.
Complexity is, in fact, a natural consequence of incompleteness of information.
The complete information about the truth of a statement is a single bit: true or
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false. The incomplete information is much more complex: it is a real number, the
probability.
As well, the complete information about reality in this interpretation is simple: a
single trajectory q(t). But incomplete information requires much more information:
Essentially, we need probabilities for all possible trajectories.
7.2. Time dependence of the wave function. Time dependence is, as well, a
natural property of information – complete or incomplete. The information about
where the particle has been yesterday transforms into some other information about
where the particle is now.
This transformation is, moreover, quite nontrivial and complex.
It is also worth to note here that the law of transformation of information is a
derivative of the real, physical law of the behaviour of the real beables.
So it necessarily has all the properties of a physical law.
We can, in particular, use the standard Popperian scientific method (making hy-
potheses, deriving predictions from them, testing and falsifying them, and inventing
better hypotheses) to find these laws.
This is, conceptually, a quite interesting point: The laws of probability themself
are best understood, following Jaynes [6], as laws of extended logic, of the logic of
plausible reasoning.
But, instead, the laws of transformation of probabilities in time follow from the
laws of the original beables in time, and, therefore, have the character of physical
laws.
Or, in other words, incomplete information develops in time in a way indistin-
guishable from the development in time of real beables. In particular, we use the
same objective scientific methods to find and test them.
So, nor the simple fact that there is a nontrivial time evolution, nor the very
physical character of the dynamical laws, in all details, up to the scientific method
we use to find them, give any argument against an interpretation in terms of in-
complete information. All this is quite natural for the evolution of incomplete
information too.
7.3. The contingent character of the wave function. There remains the most
powerful argument in favour of the reality of the wave function: Its contingent
character.
There are different wave functions, and these different wave functions lead to
objectively different probability distributions of the observable results.
If we have, in particular, different preparation procedures, leading to different
interference pictures, we really observe different interference pictures. It is com-
pletely implausible that these different interference pictures – quite objective pic-
tures – could be the result of different sets of incomplete information about the
same reality. The different interference pictures are, clearly, the result of different
things happening in reality.
But, fortunately, there is not even a reason to disagree with this. The very point
is that one has to distinguish the wave function of a small subsystem – we have no
access to any other wave functions – from the wave function of a closed system.
The last is, in fact, only an object of purely theoretical speculation, because there
is no closed system in nature except the whole universe, but we have no idea about
the wave function of the whole universe.
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For the wave function of a small subsystem, the situation is quite different. It
does not contain only incomplete information about the subsystem. In fact, it is
only an effective wave function, and there is a nice formula of dBB theory, which
can be used in our paleoclassical interpretation too: The formula which defines the
conditional wave function of a subsystem ψS(qS , t) in terms of the wave function
of the whole system (say the whole universe) ψ(qS , qE , t) and the configuration of
the environment qE(t):
(27) ψS(qS , t) = ψ(qS , qE(t), t)
This is a remarkable formula of dBB theory which contains, in particular, the so-
lution of the measurement problem: The evolution of ψS(qS , t) is, in general, not
described by a Schro¨dinger equation – if there is interaction with the environment,
the evolution of ψS(qS , t) is different, but, nonetheless, completely well-defined.
And this different evolution is the collapse of the wave function caused by measure-
ment.
Let’s note that the paleoclassical interpretation requires to justify this formula in
terms of the information about the subsystem. But this is not a problem. Indeed,
assume the trajectory of the environment qE(t) is known – say by observation of
a classical, macroscopic measurement device. Then the combination of the knowl-
edge described by the wave function of the whole system with the knowledge of
qE(t) gives exactly the same knowledge as that described by ψ
S(qS , t). Indeed, the
probability distribution gives
(28) ρS(qS , t) = ρ(qS , qE(t), t),
and, similarly, the velocity field defined by S(q) follows the same reduction principle:
(29) ∇SS(qS , t) = ∇S(qS , qE(t), t).
So in the paleoclassical interpretation the dBB formula the conditional wave func-
tion of a subsystem is a logical necessity. This provides yet another consistency
check for the interpretation.
But the reason for considering this formula here was a different one: The point
is that the wave function of the subsystem in fact contains important information
about other real beables – the actual configuration of the whole environment qE(t).
So there are real degrees of freedom, different from the configuration of the system
qS(t) itself, which are distinguished by different wave functions ψ
S(qS , t).
And we do not have to object at all if one argues that the wave function contains
such additional degrees of freedom. That’s fine, it really contains them. These
degrees of freedom are those of the configuration of the environment qE(t). And this
is not an excuse, but a logical consequence of the interpretation itself, a consequence
of the definition of the conditional wave function of the subsystem (27).
7.4. The PBR theorem. The formula (27) is also the key why we do not have to
bother about impossibility theorems like the PBR theorem [27]. In this theorem,
one considers two non-orthogonal states, in the simplest case |ψ0〉 = |0〉 and |ψ1〉 =
|+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. These states represent some probability distributions µ0(λ)
resp. µ1(λ) over some space of possible states of reality Λ. If the wave function is not
completely ontological, but at least in part epistemological, then it will happen that
the corresponding probability distributions µ0(λ), µ1(λ) have a nontrivial overlap –
this would be the case when the difference between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 is only a difference
in our knowledge, not in the real state, which could be the λ in the overlap.
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Then PBR prepares two states (or n in a more general situation) using different
preparation devices for this. Each device creates, by the choice of the experimenter,
|ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉. Then these states are combined, and such a measurement is used that
for each of the possible outcomes of the measurement the outcome would be 0 for
some particular combination of |ψ0〉 resp. |ψ1〉 of the different prepared states.
Now, if the outcome would depend only on the state λ, and this λ happens to
be with some probability q in the overlap, then with probability q2 it would be
completely unclear which of the four combinations |00〉, |0+〉, | + 0〉, | + +〉 would
be the origin of this particular pair. Now, by construction for each of these four
possibilities one of the four possible results would appear only with probability
zero. But what happens depends only on the two λ1, λ2 which both do not have
the information if their origin was |0〉 or |+〉. Whatever the result, we would obtain
a non-zero probability for this particular result even if quantum theory predicts for
the corresponding origins probability zero.
But in the paleoclassical intepretation this does not work. The point is that it is
not questioned at all that the states |ψ0〉 resp. |ψ1〉 have no overlap. Indeed, these
states have been prepared by different preparation procedures, and the configura-
tions of the preparation devices are part of the complete configuration, thus, part
of the ontology of the paleoclassical interpretation.
And this counterargument extends to quite arbitrary constructions of this type:
Whenever we consider different wave functions, these wave functions have to be
prepared somehow. The minimal interpretation defines only one way to prepare
such a wave function: A corresponding measurement so that the wave function
which is prepared is the eigenstate which corresponds to some eigenvalue of the
measurement. The eigenvalue is, then, after the preparation part of the configura-
tion of the universe, namely part of the configuration of the measurement device
(the position of its pointer).
The wave function which does, according to the paleoclassical interpretation, not
contain any information about the configuration of the environment at all, would
be the wave function of the whole universe.
7.5. Conclusion. So the consideration of the arguments in favour of a beable
status for the wave function, even if they seem to be strong and decisive at a first
look, appear to be in no conflict at all with the interpretation of the wave function
of a closed system in terms of incomplete information about this system.
The most important point to understand this is, of course, the very fact that the
conditional wave function of the small subsystems of the universe we can consider
really have a different character – they depend on the configuration of the environ-
ment. And, so, the argumentation that these conditional wave functions describe
real degrees of freedom, external to the system itself, is accepted and even derived
from the interpretation.
Nonetheless, the point that nor the complexity of the wave function of the whole
universe, nor its evolution in time, nor the physical character of the laws of this evo-
lution are in any conflict with an interpretation in terms of incomplete information
is an important insight too.
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8. The Wallstrom objection
Wallstrom [10] has made an objection against giving the fields of the polar de-
composition ρ(q), S(q) (instead of the wave function ψ(q) itself) a fundamental
role.
The first point is that around the zeros of the quantum mechanical wave function,
the flow has no longer a potential. The quantum flow is a potential one only where
ρ(q) > 0. But in general there will be submanifolds of dimension n − 2 where the
wave function is zero. And for a closed path q(s) around such a zero submanifold
one finds that
(30)
∮
mijv
i(q)dqj 6= 0.
This, in itself, is unproblematic for the interpretation: The condition of poten-
tiality is not assumed to be a fundamental one – the fundamental object is not S(q)
but the vi(q). There will be some mechanism in subquantum theory which locally
reduces violations of potentiality, so we can assume that the flow is a potential one
only as an approximation.
It is also quite natural to assume that such a mechanism works more efficient for
higher densities and fails near the zeros of the density.
So having them localized at the zeros of the density is quite nice – not for a
really fundamental equation, which is not supposed to have any infinities, but if we
consider quantum theory as being only an approximation.
The really problematic part of the Wallstom objection is a different one: It is
that the quantum flow has to fulfill a nontrivial quantization condition, namely
(31)
∮
mijv
i(q)dqj =
∮
∂jS(q)dq
j = 2pim~, m ∈ Z.
The point is, in particular, that the equations (6), (8) in flow variables are not
sufficient to derive this quantization condition. So, in fact, this set of equations is
not empirically equivalent to the Schro¨dinger equation.
This is, of course, no wonder, given the fact that the equivalence holds only
for ρ(q) = |ψ(q)|2 > 0. But, however natural, empirical inequivalence is empirical
inequivalence.
Then, this condition looks quite artificial in terms of the vi. What is a triviality
in terms of the wave function – that it has to be uniquely defined globally – looks
extremely artificial and strange if formulated in terms of the vi(q). As Wallstrom
[10] writes, to “the best of my knowledge, this condition [(31)] has not yet found
any convincing explanation outside the context of the Schro¨dinger equation”.
8.1. A solution for this problem. Fortunately I have found a solution for this
problem in [11]. I do not claim that it is a complete one – there is a part which is
beyond the scope of an interpretation, which has to be left to particular proposals
for a subquantum theory. One has to check if the assumptions I have made about
such a subquantum theory are really fulfilled in that particular theory.
The first step of the solution is to recognize that, for empirical equivalence with
quantum theory, it is sufficient to recover only solutions with simple zeros. Such
simple zeros give m = ±1 in the quantization condition (31). This is a consequence
of the principles of general position: A small enough modification of the wave
function cannot be excluded by observation, but leads to a wave function in general
position, and in general position the zeros of the wave function are non-degenerated.
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The next step is a look at the actual solutions. For the simple, two dimensional,
rotational invariant, zero potential case these solutions are defined by S(q) = mϕ,
ρ(q) = r2|m|. And this extends to the general situation, where S(q) = mϕ+ S˜(q),
ρ(q) = r2|m|ρ˜(q), such that S˜(q) is well-defined in a whole environment of the zero,
and ρ˜(0) > 0.
But that means we can replace the problem of justifying an integer m in S(q) =
mϕ, where all values of m seem equally plausible, by the quite different problem
of justifying ρ(q) = r2 (once we need only m = ±1) in comparison with other
ρ(q) = rα. This is already a quite different perspective.
We make the natural conclusion and invent a criterion which prefers ρ(q) = r2
in comparison with other rα. This is quite easy:
Postulate 1 (regularity of ∆ρ). If ρ(q) = 0, then 0 < ∆ρ(q) < ∞ almost every-
where.
This postulate already solves the inequivalence argument. The equations (6),
(8) for ρ(q) > 0, together with postulate 1, already defines a theory empirically
equivalent to quantum theory (even if the equivalence is not exact, because only
solutions in general position are recovered).
It remains to invent a justification for this postulate.
The next step is to rewrite equation (6) for stable states in form of a balance of
energy densities. In particular, we can rewrite the densitized quantum potential as
(32) Q[ρ]ρ =
1
2
ρu2 − 1
4
∆ρ,
with the “osmotic velocity” u(q) = 12∇ ln ρ(q). Then the energy balance looks like
(33)
1
2
ρv2 +
1
2
ρu2 + V (q) =
1
4
∆ρ.
So, the operator we have used in the postulate is not an arbitrary expression,
but a meaningful term, which appears in an important equations – an energy bal-
ance. This observation is already sufficient to justify the ∆ρ(q) < ∞ part of the
condition. There may be, of course, subquantum theories which allow for infinities
in energy densities, but it is hardly a problem for a subquantum theory to justify
that expressions which appear like energy densities in energy balances have to be
finite.
Last but not least, subquantum theory has to allow for nonzero curl ∇× v, but
has to suppress it to obtain a quantum limit. One way to suppress it is to add a
penalty term U(ρ,∇× v) which increases with |∇ × v|. This would give
(34)
1
2
ρv2 +
1
2
ρu2 + V (q) + U(ρ,∇× v) = 1
4
∆ρ.
Moreover subquantum theory has to regularize the infinities of v and u at the zeros
of the density. One can plausibly expect that this gives finite but large values
of |∇ × v| at zero which decrease sufficiently fast with r. Now, a look at the
energy balance shows that, if the classical potential term V (q) is neglected (for
example assuming that it changes only smoothly) the only term which can balance
U(ρ,∇× v) at zero is the ∆ρ terms, which, therefore, has to be finite but nonzero.
Or, at least, it would not be difficult to modify the definition of U(ρ,∇× v) in such
a way that the extremal value ∆ρ = 0 (we have necessarily ∆ρ ≥ 0 at the minima)
has to be excluded.
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So the postulate seems nicely justifiable. For some more details I refer to [11].
What remains is the particular job of particular proposals for subquantum theories
– they have to check if the way to justify the postulate really works in this theory,
or if it may be justified in some other way. But this is beyond the scope of the
interpretation. What has to be done by the interpretation – in particular, to obtain
empirical equivalence with quantum theory – has been done.
9. A Popperian argument for preference of an information-based
interpretation
One of Popper’s basic ideas was that we should prefer – as long as possible
without conflict with experience – theories which are more restrictive, make more
certain predictions, depend on less parameters. And, while this criterion has been
formulated for theories, it should be applied, for the same reasons, to more general
principles of constructing theories too.
This gives an argument in preference for an interpretation in terms of incomplete
information.
Indeed, let’s consider, from this point of view, the difference between interpre-
tations of fields ρ(q), vi(q) in terms of a probability for some real trajectories q(t),
and interpretations which reify them as describing some external reality, different
from q(t), which influences the trajectory q(t).
It is quite clear and obvious which of the two approaches is more restrictive.
Designing theories of the first type, we are restricted, for the real physics, to theories
for single trajectories q(t). Then, given that we have identified the connection
between the fields ρ(q), vi(q) and q(t) as those of a probability flow, everything else
follows. There is no longer any freedom of choice for the field equations. If we have
fixed the Hamiltonian evolution for p(t), q(t), the Liouville field equation for ρ(p, q)
is simply a logical consequence. Similarly, the continuity equation (8) is a law of
logic, it cannot be modified, is no longer a subject of theoretical speculation. It is
fixed by the interpretation of ρ(q), vi(q) as a probability flow, in the same way as
ρ(q) ≥ 0 is fixed.
In the second case, we have much more freedom – the full freedom of speculation
about field theories in general. In particular, the continuity equation can be mod-
ified, introducing, say, some creation and destruction processes, which are quite
natural if ρ(q) describes a density of some external objects.
The derivation of the U(1) global phase shift symmetry is another particular
example of such an additional logical law following from the interpretation.
So there are some consequences of the interpretation which have purely logical
character, including the continuity equation, ρ(q) ≥ 0, and the U(1) global phase
shift symmetry. But these will not be the only consequences. The other equations
will be restricted, in comparison with field theories, too, but in a less clear and ob-
vious way. There is, last but not least, a large freedom of choice for the equations of
the real beables q(t), which corresponds to a similarly large freedom of choice of the
resulting equations for ρ(q), vi(q). But this freedom of choice will be, nonetheless,
much smaller than the completely arbitrariness of a general field theory.
This consideration strongly indicates that we have to prefer the interpretation
in terms of incomplete information until it has been falsified, until it appears in-
compatible with observation.
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The immediate, sufficiently trivial logical consequences we have found yet are
compatible with the Schro¨dinger equation and therefore with observation. So we
should prefer this interpretation.
10. Open problems
Instead of using such a Popperian argumentation, I could have, as well, used
simply Ockham’s razor: Don’t multiply entities without necessity. Once, given this
interpretation, there is no necessity for more than a single classical trajectory q(t),
one should not introduce other real entities like really existing wave functions.
But the Popperian consideration has the advantage that it implicitly defines an
interesting research program.
10.1. Other restrictions following from the interpretation. In fact, given
the restrictive character of the interpretation, there may be other, additional, more
subtle restrictions of the equations for probability flows ρ(q), vi(q), restrictions
which we have not yet identified, but which plausibly exist.
So what are these additional restrictions for equations for probability flows ρ(q),
vi(q) in comparison with four general, unspecific fields fulfilling a continuity equa-
tion? I have no answer.
This is clearly an interesting question for future research. It is certainly also a
question interesting in itself, interesting from point of view of pure mathematics,
for a better understanding of probability theory.
The consequences may be fatal for this approach – it may be that we find that the
Schro¨dinger equation does not fit into this set of restrictions even approximately7.
This possibility of falsification is, of course, the very point of the Popperian consid-
eration. I’m nonetheless not afraid that this happens, but this is only a personal
opinion.
The situation may be, indeed, much better: That this subclass of theories con-
tains the Schro¨dinger equation, but appears to be heavily restricted by some ad-
ditional, yet unknown, conditions. Then, all of these additional restrictions would
give us additional partial answers to the “why the quantum” question.
10.2. Why is the Schro¨dinger equation linear? The most interesting question
which remains open is why the Schro¨dinger equation is linear. We have found only
some part of the answer – an explanation for the global U(1) phase symmetry based
on the informational content and of the homogeneity based on the reduction of the
equation to subsystems.
But, given that the pre-Schro¨dinger equation is non-linear, but interpreted in the
same way, the linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation cannot follow from the inter-
pretation taken alone. Some other considerations are necessary to obtain linearity.
One idea is to justify linearity as an approximation. Last but not least, lineariza-
tion is a standard way to obtain approximations.
The problem of stability in time may be also relevant here. The pre-Schro¨dinger
equation becomes invalid after a short period of time, when the first caustic appears.
There is no such problem in quantum theory, which has a lot of stable solutions.
Then, there should be not only stable solutions, but also slowly changing solutions:
7That it does not fit exactly will be shown below, in the consideration about quantum com-
puters. But for the interpretation to be viable, exactness is not obligatory – it is sufficient that
the Schro¨dinger equation can be obtained as an approximation.
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It doesn’t even matter if the fundamental time scale is Planck time or something
much larger – even if it is only the time scale of strong interactions, all the things
changing around us are changing in an extremely slow way in comparison with this
fundamental time scale. But the linear character of the Schro¨dinger equation gives
us a way to obtain solutions slowly changing in time by combining different stable
solutions with close energies.
11. A theoretical possibility to test: The speedup of quantum
computers
There is an idea which suggests, at least in principle, a way to distinguish ob-
servationally the paleoclassical interpretation (or, more accurate, the class of all
more fundamental theories compatible with the paleoclassical interpretation) from
the minimal interpretation.
The idea is connected with the theory of quantum computers. If quantum com-
puters really work as predicted by quantum theory, these abilities will provide
fascinating tests of the accuracy of quantum theory. In the case of Simon’s algo-
rithm, the speed-up is exponential over any classical algorithm. It may be a key for
the explanation of this speed-up that the state space (phase space) of a composite
classical system is the Cartesian product of the state spaces of its subsystems, while
the state space of a composite quantum system is the tensor product of the state
spaces of its subsystems. For n qubits, the quantum state space has 2n instead of n
dimensions. So the information required to represent a general state increases ex-
ponentially with n (see, for example, [15]). There is also the idea “that a quantum
computation is something like a massively parallel classical computation, for all
possible values of a function. This appears to be Deutsch’s view, with the parallel
computations taking place in parallel universes.” [15].
It is this exponential speedup which suggests that the predictions of standard
QM may differ from those of the paleoclassical interpretation. An exact quan-
tum computer would have all beables contained in the wave function as degrees
of freedom. A quantum computer in the paleoclassical interpretation has only the
resources provided by its beables. But these beables are, essentially, only the clas-
sical states of the universe. Given the exponential difference between them, n vs.
2n dimensions for qubits instead of classical bits, an exact quantum computer real-
izable at least in principle in a laboratory on Earth can have more computational
resources than a the corresponding computer of the paleoclassical interpretation,
which can use only the classical degrees of freedom, even if these are the classical
degrees of freedom of the whole observable universe.
But if we distort a quantum computer, even slightly, the result will be fatal for
the computation. In particular, if this distortion is of the type of the paleoclassical
interpretation, which replaces an exact computer with a 2n-dimensional state space
by an approximate one with onlyN dimensions, then even for quite largeN ≫ n the
approximate computer will be simply unable to do the exact computations, even in
principle. There simply are no parallel universes in the paleoclassical interpretation
to make the necessary parallel computations.
So, roughly speaking, the prediction of the paleoclassical interpretation is that
a sufficiently large quantum computer will fail to give the promised exponential
speedup. The exponential speedup will work only up to a certain limit, defined by
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the logarithm of the relation between the size of the whole universe and the size of
the quantum computer.
Of course, we do not know the size of the universe. It may be much larger than
the size of the observable universe, or even infinite. Nonetheless, this argument,
applied to any finite model of the universe, shows that the true theory, the theory
in the configurational beables alone, cannot be exactly quantum theory. This is in
my opinion the most interesting conclusion.
But let’s see if we can, nonetheless, make even testable (at least in principle)
predictions. So let’s presuppose that the universe is finite, and, moreover, let’s
assume that this size is not too many orders larger than the its observable part.
This would be already sufficient to obtain some numbers about the number of qubits
such that the 2n exponential speedup is no longer possible. This number will be
sufficiently small, small enough that a quantum computer in a laboratory on Earth
will be sufficient to reach this limit.
And, given the logarithmic dependence on N , increasing N does not help much.
If it is possible to build a quantum computer with n qubits, why not with 2n? This
would already move the size of the universe into completely implausible regions.
11.1. The speed of quantum information as another boundary. Instead of
caring about the size of the universe, it may be more reasonable to care about the
size of the region which can causally influence us. Here I do not have in mind the
limits given by of relativity, by the speed of light. Given the violation of Bell’s
inequality, there has to be (from a realist’s point of view) a hidden preferred frame
where some other sort of information – quantum information – is transferred with a
speed much larger than the speed of light. But if we assume that the true theory has
some locality properties, even if only in terms of a much larger maximal speed, the
region which may be used by a quantum computer for its computational speedup
decreases in comparison with the size of the universe.
So if we assume that there is such a speed limit for quantum information, then
we obtain in the paleoclassical interpretation even more restrictive limits for the
speedup reachable by quantum computers, limits which depend logarithmically on
the speed limit for quantum information.
Nonetheless, I personally don’t believe that quantum computers will really reach
large speedups. I think the general inaccuracy of human devices will prevent us
from constructing quantum computers which can really use the full 2n power for
large enough n. I would guess that the accuracy requirements necessary to obtain
a full 2n speedup will also grow exponentially. So I guess that quantum computers
will fail already on a much smaller scale.
12. Conclusions
So it’s time to summarize:
• The unknown, true theory of the whole universe is a theory defined on
the classical configuration space Q, with the configuration q(t) evolving in
absolute time t as a complete description of all beables.
• The wave function of the whole universe is interpreted as a consistent set
of incomplete information about these fundamental beables.
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• In particular, ρ(q) defines not some “objective” probability, but an incom-
plete set of information about the real position q, described, as required by
the logic of plausible reasoning, by a probability distribution ρ(q)dq.
• The phase S(q) describes, via the “guiding equation”, the expectation value
〈q˙〉 of the velocity given the actual configuration q itself. So the “guiding
equation” is not a physical equation, but has to be interpreted as part of the
definition of S(q), which describes which information about q is contained
in S(q).
• Only a constant phase factor of ψ(q) does not contain any relevant infor-
mation about the trajectory q(t). Therefore, the equations for ψ(q) should
not depend on such a factor.
• The Schro¨dinger equation is interpreted as an approximate equation. More
is not to be expected, given that it describes the evolution of an incomplete
set of information.
• The linear character of the Schro¨dinger equation is interpreted as an addi-
tional hint that it is only an approximate equation.
• The interpretation can be used to reinterpret Nelsonian stochastics. The
resulting picture is conceptually more consistent than the original proposal.
• The Wallstrom objection appears much less serious than expected. The
quantization condition for simple zeros (which is sufficient because it is the
general position) can be derived from the much simpler regularity postulate
that 0 < ∆ρ(q) <∞ if ρ(q) = 0. While a final justification of this condition
has to be left to a more fundamental theory, it is, as shown in [11], plausible
that this is not a problem for such theories.
• If the true theory of the universe is defined on classical configurations, and
the whole universe is finite, quantum computers can give their promised
exponential speedup only up to an upper bound for the number of qubits,
which is much smaller than the available qubits of the universe. This ar-
gument shows that the Schro¨dinger equation has to be approximate.
• The dBB problem with of the “action without reaction” asymmetry is
solved: For effective wave function, the collapse defines the back-reaction,
for the wave function of the whole universe there should be no such back-
reaction – it is only an equation about incomplete information about reality,
not about reality itself.
• The wave functions of small subsystems obtain a seemingly objective, phys-
ical character only because they, as conditional wave functions, depend on
the physical beables of the environment.
From point of view of simplicity, the paleoclassical interpretation is superior to
all alternatives. The identification of the fundamental beables with the classical
configuration space trajectory q(t) is sufficient for this point.
It has also the additional advantage that it leads to strong restrictions of the
properties of a more fundamental, sub-quantum theory: It has to be a theory
completely defined on the classical configuration space. Moreover, it has to be a
theory which, in its statistical variant, leads to a Fokker-Planck-like equations for
the probability flow defined by the classical flow variables ρ(q) and vi(q).
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Appendix A. Compatibility with relativity
Most physicists consider the problem of compatibility with relativity as the major
problem of dBB-like interpretations – sufficient to reject them completely. But I
have different, completely independent reasons for accepting a preferred frame, so
that I don’t worry about this.
There are two parts of this compatibility problem, a physical and a philosophical
one, which should not be mingled:
The physical part is that we need a dBB version of relativistic quantum field
theories, in particular of the standard model of particle physics – versions which
do not have to change the fundamental scheme of dBB, and, therefore, may have a
hidden preferred frame.
The philosophical part is the incompatibility of a hidden preferred frame with
relativistic metaphysics.
The physical problem is heavily overestimated, in part because of the way dBB
theory is often presented: As a theory of many particles. The appropriate way is
to present it as a general theory in terms of an abstract configuration space Q, and
to recognize that field theories as well as their lattice regularizations fit into this
scheme. The fields are, of course, fields on three-dimensional space R3 changing in
time, and their lattice regularizations live on three-dimensional spatial lattices Z3,
not four-dimensional space-time lattices. But this violation of manifest relativistic
symmetry is already part of the second, philosophical problem.
The simple, seemingly non-relativistic Hamiltonian (3), with p2 instead of√
p2 +m2, is also misleading: For relativistic field theories the quadratic Hamil-
tonian is completely sufficient. Indeed, a relativistic field Lagrangian is of type
(35) L =
1
2
((∂tϕ)
2 − (∂iϕ)2)− V (ϕ).
This gives momentum fields pi = ∂tϕ and the Hamiltonian
(36) H =
1
2
(pi2 + (∂iϕ)
2) + V (ϕ) =
1
2
pi2 + V˜ (ϕ)
quadratic in pi, thus, the straightforward field generalization of the standard Hamil-
tonian (3). And for a lattice regularization, the Hamiltonian is already exactly of
the form (3). So, whatever one thinks about the dBB problems with other rela-
tivistic fields, it is certainly not relativity itself which causes the problem.
The problem with fermions and gauge fields is certainly more subtle. Here,
my proposal is described in [26]. It heavily depends on a preferred frame, but
for completely different reasons – interpretations of quantum theory are not even
mentioned. Nonetheless, fermion fields are obtained from field theories of type (35),
and gauge-equivalent states are interpreted as fundamentally different beables, so
that no BRST factorization procedure is necessary.
Another part of the physical problem is compatibility with relativistic gravity.
Here I argue that it is the general-relativistic concept of background-freedom which
is incompatible with quantum theory and has to be given up. I use a quantum
variant of the classical hole argument for this purpose [29]. As a replacement, I
propose a theory of gravity with background and preferred frame [28].
So there remains only the philosophical part. But here the violation of Bell’s
inequality gives a strong argument in favour of a preferred frame: Every realistic
interpretation needs it. Moreover, the notion of metaphysical realism presupposed
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by “realistic interpretation” is so weak that Norsen [25] has titled a paper “against
realism”, arguing that one should not mention realism at all in this context. The
metaphysical notion of realism used there is so weak that to give it up does not
save Einstein locality at all – it is presupposed in this notion too.
Appendix B. Pauli’s symmetry argument
There is also another symmetry argument against dBB theory, which goes back
to Pauli [13], which deserves to be mentioned:
. . . the artificial asymmetry introduced in the treatment of the two
variables of a canonically conjugated pair characterizes this form of
theory as artificial metaphysics. ([13], as quoted by [14]),
“. . . the Bohmian corpuscle picks out by fiat a preferred basis
(position) . . . ” [16]
Here my counterargument is presented in [30]. I construct there an explicit
counterexample, based on the KdV equation, that the Hamilton operator alone,
without a specification which operator measures position, is not sufficient to fix
the physics. It follows that the canonical operators have to be part of the complete
definition of a quantum theory and so have to be distinguished by the interpretation
as something special, different from the other similar pairs of operators.
The Copenhagen interpretation makes such a difference – this is one of the roles
played by the classical part. But attempts to get rid of the classical part of the
Copenhagen interpretation, without adding something else as a replacement, are
not viable [31]. One has to introduce a replacement.
Recognizing that the configuration space has to be part of the definition of the
physics gives more power to an old argument in favour of the pilot wave approach,
made already by de Broglie at the Solvay conference 1927:
“It seems a little paradoxical to construct a configuration space
with the coordinates of points which do not exist.” [2].
Appendix C. Problems with field theories
It has been argued that fields are problematic as beables in general for dBB
theory, a point which could be problematic for the paleoclassical interpretation
too.
In particular, the equivalence proof between quantum theory and dBB theory
depends on the fact that the overlap of the wave function for different macroscopic
states is irrelevant. But it appeared in field theory that for one-particle states there
is always a non-trivial overlap, even if these field states are localized far away from
each other.
But, as I have shown in [32], the overlap decreases sufficiently fast (approximately
exponentially) with greater particle numbers.
Appendix D. Why we observe configurations, not wave packets
In the many worlds community there is a quite popular argument against dBB
theory – that it is many worlds in denial (for example, see [16]). But this argument
depends on the property of dBB theory that the wave function is a beable, a really
existing object. So it cannot be applied against the paleoclassical interpretation,
where the wave function is no longer a beable.
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But in fact it is invalid also as an argument against dBB theory. In fact, already
in dBB theory it is the configuration q(t) which is observable and not the wave
function.
This fact is sometimes not presented in a clear enough way, so that misrepre-
sentations become possible. For example Brown and Wallace [16] find support for
another interpretation even in Bohm’s original paper [3]:
. . . even in his hidden variables paper II of 1952, Bohm seems to
associate the wavepacket chosen by the corpuscles as the represent-
ing outcome of the measurement – the role of the corpuscles merely
being to point to it. ([16] p. 15)
and support their claim with the following quote from Bohm
Now, the packet entered by the apparatus variable y determines the
actual result of the measurement, which the observer will obtain
when he looks at the apparatus. ([3] p. 118)
This quote may, indeed, lead to misunderstandings about this issue. So, maybe we
observe only the wave packet containing the configuration, instead of configuration
itself?
My answer is a clear no. I don’t believe into the existence of sufficiently localized
wave packets to construct some effective reality out of them, as assumed by many
worlders.
Today they use decoherence to justify their belief that wave packets will be
sufficiently localized. But decoherence presupposes another structure – a decom-
position of the world into systems. Only from point of view of such a subdivision
of q into, say, (x, y), a non-localized wave function like e−(x−y)
2/2 may look sim-
ilar to a superposition, for different a, of product states localized in x and y like
e−(x−a)
2 · e−(y−a)2 .
But where does this subdivision into systems come from? The systems around us
– observers, planets, measurement devices – cannot be used for this purpose. They
do not exist on the fundamental level, as a predefined structure on the configura-
tion space. But the subdivision into systems has to, once we need it to construct
localized objects. Else, the whole construction would be circular.
So one would have to postulate something else as a fundamental subdivision into
systems. This something else is undefined in the interpretations considered here,
so an interpretation based on it is simply another interpretation, with another,
additional fundamental structure – a fundamental subdivision into systems.
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